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David Hughes* "Cinderella" Services in the NHS
Siobhan McClelland Internal Market: Does Contracting
Lesley Griffiths Make a Difference?
This paper examines the impact of the NHS internal market reforms on an aspect
of equity in the British system that features little in recent policy commentary: the
allocation of resources between acute services for the entire population and non-
acute services for the elderly, the mentally ill, and the disabled (the so-called
"Cinderella" services). The authors' research on health planning and contracting
in the NHS in Wales suggests that patterns of services have remained largely
unchanged, and that pressures in the reformed system, such as the Patient's
Charter initiative, prevent any major reallocation of resources away from the
acute sector. Given the ineffectiveness of the contract mechanism in changing
funding patterns, the authors consider whether the wider NHS reforms have
nevertheless extended the legal remedies available to patients from the "Cinderella"
groups faced with inadequate services. Recent cases suggest that, while the
courts are reassessing the principles applied in reviewing administrative action
affecting the allocation of health care resources, it is patients requiring acute care
who are most likely to benefit. The authors conclude that, in terms of progress
towards a more equitable distribution of resources between sectors, the NHS
internal market is not a good model for other nations to emulate.
Les auteurs examinent l'impact des r6formes touchant le systeme de sante du
Royaume-Uni, le NHS (National Health Service), sur I'equite dans la r6partition
des ressources entre les services de traitement en aigu offerts a la population en
g6ndral et les services de longue duree consacres aux plus !ges, aux malades
mentaux et aux handicapp~s (le groupe 'Cinderella'). Suite a des recherches, les
auteurs constatent que lespratiques de planification etd'engagements contractuels
sous la NHS au pays de Galles n'ont pas modifie les modeles de services d~ja
offerts. De plus, ils constatent que des initiatives telle la 'Charte du patient'
(Patient's Charter) 6labor6e sous le nouveau systeme exercent des pressions
emp~chant I'affectation des ressources a des secteurs autres que le secteur de
traitement en aigu. Le mod&le contractuel 6tant inad6quat pour changer les
modes de financement dans le secteur de la sante, les auteurs se penchent sur
la proposition suivante: la r6forme du NHS offrirait-elle aux malades chroniques
un plus grand nombre de recours judiciaires en cas de services inad6quats?
Pendant que les tribunaux r6visent les pratiques administratives concernant la
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r~partition des ressources allouees aux soins de la santo, il est probable que les
patients recevant les services de traitement en aigu en profiteront. Les auteurs
viennent a la conclusion que le module du NHS n'est pas un exemple a suivre
pour atteindre une distribution 6quitable des ressources entre les difforents
secteurs du systeme de sant6.
Introduction
Since the late 1980s many developed countries have implemented
reforms of publicly financed health care systems,' mostly through the
introduction of managed markets, competition and arrangements for
purchaser/provider contracting.2 In recent years the Canadian system,
long seen as an exemplary model of universal health care insurance, has
been the subject of increased criticism,3 with the result that several
provinces are contemplating market-oriented reforms and reviewing the
experience of other nations. There is growing interest in contracts as a
means of specifying performance standards and fostering competition.
Britain was one of the first European countries to embark on reform and
its "health care experiment"4 has been followed by policy makers in
many countries. In contrast to those reform efforts where change is
piecemeal and incremental, the British approach has used primary
legislation, in the form of the National Health Service and Community
Care Act 1990 (hereinafter NHSCCA), to achieve radical change in the
organization and delivery of services. The National Health Service
(NHS) was divided into purchaser and provider sides, with district health
authorities (DHAs) and general practitioner fundholders letting contracts
to buy services from hospitals and community units, now re-constituted
1. Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), The Reform of Health
Care Systems: A Comparative Analysis of Seven OECD Countries (OECD: Paris, 1994); J.W.
Hurst, "Reforming Health Care in Seven European Nations" (1991) 10 Health Aff. 7; B. Abel-
Smith & E. Mossialos, "Cost-Containment and Health Care Reform: a Study of the European
Union" (1994) 28 Health Policy 89; A.C. Twaddle, "Health System Reforms: Toward a
Framework for International Comparisons" (1996) 43 Soc. Sci. & Med. 637; W.P. van de Ven,
"Market-Oriented Health Care Reforms: Trends and Future Options" (1996) 43 Soc. Sci. &
Med. 655.
2. R. Saltman & C. von Otter, Planned Markets and Public Competition (Buckingham: Open
University Press, 1992); R. Saltman & C. von Otter, eds., Implementing Planned Markets in
Health Care: Balancing Social and Economic Responsibility (Buckingham: Open University
Press, 1995); C.D. Collins, D.J. Hunter & A.T. Green, "The Market and Health Sector Reform"
(1994) 8 J. Mgmt. Med. 42.
3. R. Chernomas & A. Sepehri, "An Economist's Brief Guide to the Recent Debate on the
Canadian Health Care System" (1994) 24 Int'l J. Health Serv. 189; T. Rathwell, "Health Care
in Canada: A System in Turmoil" (1994) 27 Health Policy 5.
4. P. Day & R. Klein, "Britain's Health Care Experiment" (1991) 10 Health Aff. 39.
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as autonomous NHS trusts.5 The resultant "internal market" system has
generated a large corpus of published research accessible to the interna-
tional policy community.
6
This edition of the Dalhousie Law Journal has a dual focus on "lessons
from away" and vulnerable populations, and in this paper we assess the
impact of the British reforms on one area largely ignored in the existing
policy commentary: the allocation of resources between the acute hospi-
tal sector and non-acute services for the elderly, the mentally ill, and those
with physical and learning disabilities7 -the so-called "Cinderella"
services. In the sections that follow we first discuss the model of
population-based purchasing implicit in the NHS reforms, which many
believed would result in a re-allocation of resources between services and
thereby maximize "health gain." We then consider findings from two
studies of the NHS in Wales -one of Health Authority purchasing plans
and one of contracting behaviour- and assess how far the new system of
contracting actually functioned to change patterns of service provision.
The studies provide no evidence of any significant transfer of expenditure
from the acute sector towards primary care and community health
services, and highlight certain pressures that continue to pull resources
towards acute care. In light of the failure of the internal market to improve
the position of the non-acute services by reallocating resources, we
consider whether the wider NHS reforms have nevertheless extended the
legal remedies available to patients and relatives faced with curtailed or
inadequate services. We examine trends in judicial review during the
1980s and 1990s, but conclude that-to the extent that the courts are
becoming more willing to intervene in cases involving NHS resource
allocation- it is patients requiring acute care, rather than the "Cinderella"
groups, who are most likely to benefit.
I. Using Contracts to Reshape the NHS
The NHS reforms emerged out of a perceived crisis of funding in the acute
hospital sector, and the contemporaneous policy debate about the benefits
of competition, efficiency and "money following patients" related prima-
rily to the delivery of acute services. However, the reforms were also
5. J. Butler, Patients, Policies and Politics: Before and After Workingfor Patients (Buckingham:
Open University Press, 1992).
6. R. Robinson & J. Le Grand, Evaluating the NHS Reforms (London: King's Fund, 1994).
R. Robinson, "The Impact of the NHS Reforms 1991-1995: A Review of Research Evidence"
(1996) 18 J. Pub. Health Med. 337. R. Flynn & G. Williams, eds., Contracting for Health:
Quasi-Markets and the National Health Service (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
7. Formerly known in Britain as mental handicap.
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intended to enable DHAs to move away from historic patterns of resource
allocation. The architects of the reforms argued that they "would devolve
more power to the local scene ... and would create a service structure
more in tune with the needs and wishes of the people."8 The white paper,
Working for Patients, identified the role of DHAs as purchasers as:
Ensuring that the health needs of the population for which they are
responsible are met: that there are effective services for the prevention and
control of diseases and the promotion of health; that their population has
access to a range of high-quality value for money services.9
This new role required DHAs to assess the health needs of their resident
populations and to commission services to meet those needs. Contracting
would be based on assessed needs and evidence of the clinical effective-
ness of the purchased services, rather than existing service patterns, or the
"he who shouts loudest" pressures exerted by consultants. This would
open up the possibility of real change in the balance of services. Kenneth
Clarke, appearing before the House of Commons Social Services Com-
mittee, suggested that it might be possible to demonstrate a dramatic
improvement in service by allocating more resources to the Cinderella
services rather than "the ritzy, high-tech stuff."' 0
The underfunding of the Cinderella services-including non-acute
services for the elderly, the disabled and the mentally ill-had been seen
as a major problem in the NHS of the 1970s and 80s."1 Despite the
expressed commitment of successive governments to transfer resources
from the acute sector into these areas, it proved difficult to achieve
implementation at the health authority and hospital level. Many commen-
tators saw this as a prime example of the ability of the medical profession
to resist the implementation of strategic policies, and argued that one
advantage of the purchaser-provider split and the new system of contract-
ing for clinical services would be managers' increased ability to counter
vested professional interests."
8. Butler, supra note 5 at 49.
9. U.K., Department of Health, Working for Patients (London: HMSO, 1989) at 14-15.
10. J. Warden, "Letter From Westminster- Clarke Steps Out" (1989) 298 Br. Med. J. 1478.
11. The term came into wide usage during this period to refer to NHS services, such as those
mentioned in the text, which (as in the original Cinderella story) did not receive the attention
and resources given to more favoured siblings. For statements of priorities by Ministers that
use this language see: D. Owen, In Sickness and in Health: The Politics of Medicine (London:
Quartet, 1976); R. Moyle, DHSS Press Release no. 78/62, 22 February 1978. For academic
comment see: S. Haywood & A. Alazewski, Crisis in the Health Service: The Politics of
Management (London: Croom Helm, 1980); C. Ham, Policy Making in the VHS (London:
Macmillan, 1981). Both the unflattering "Cinderella" label and the reality of service underfunding
reflect the relative lack of power of these patient groups.
12. S. Harrison, "Working the Markets: Purchaser/Provider Separation in English Health
Care" (1991) 21 Int'l J. Health Serv. 625.
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By the early 1990s, the term Cinderella services was still associated
with the traditional client groups,but usually in the context of primary and
community health services. 3 During the previous decade a major re-
drawing of the boundaries of health and social care had occurred. Much
of the stock of NIS long-stay beds had been lost, and replaced by beds
in nursing and residential homes outside the health service. 4 As local
authority social services departments assumed responsibility for manag-
ing more community services, an increasingly pluralistic social care
sector developed, with significant voluntary and private sector involve-
ment. 5 Parallel to the arrangements laid down for contracting in the
NHS, the NHSCCA made provision for local government authorities to
contract with providers for community care services. The new commu-
nity care arrangements were financed partly through the Social Security
benefits system and partly through a Special Transitional Grant paid by
central government to the local authorities. This shift in the locus of care
relieved pressure on NHS budgets,but replaced NHS care free at the point
of delivery with care financed by fees or means-tested state benefits. The
community health services that remained within the NHS included
district nursing, health visiting, therapeutic treatment and rehabilitation,
thereby encompassing traditional services for mothers and children as
well as those for the management of chronic illness, disability and mental
illness in the community. By 1996 there were about sixty specialized
community health services trusts in England, a further twenty-three
combined acute and community trusts, and sixty trusts combining com-
munity services with hospital services for mental illness and learning
disabilities.1
6
Official policy from the 1990s onwards has emphasized the benefits of
a primary care-led NHS.'7 Primary care in this context is understood to
include not only family doctors but other health professionals, such as
community-based nurses, midwives, health visitors and therapists, and
thus overlaps with the community health services. Redmayne, in her
13. N. Bosanquet, "Primary Care: Reviving the Sleeping Beauty" (1995) 105(5448) Health
Serv. J. 20.
14. Audit Commission, Homeward Bound: A New Course for Community Health (London:
HMSO, 1992); D. Greaves, "Changing Priorities in Residential Medical and Social Services"
(1997) 23 J. Med. Ethics 77.
15. J. Mohan, "Privatization in the British Health Sector: A Challenge to the NHS?" in
J .Gabe, M. Calnan & M. Bury, eds., The Sociology of the Health Service (London: Routledge,
1991).
16. R. Flynn, G. Williams & S. Pickard, Markets and Networks: Contracting in Community
Health Services (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1996).
17. National Health Service Executive, Developing NHS Purchasing and GP Fundholding:
Towards a Primary Care-Led NHS (Leeds: NHSE, 1994).
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study of the 1994/95 purchasing plans of sixty-six English health authori-
ties, found a striking degree of unanimity with regard to the prediction
"that primary care will be the main focus of health care delivery in future,"
and also noted that many had plans to shift resources from the acute
secondary sector into primary and community services. 8 Although it
was not possible on the basis of the plans to assess to what extent most had
actually moved resources, "tentative" evidence from six DHAs who
provided projections of future expenditure suggested at least a modest
shift from the acute to the primary and community sectors.
II. Purchasing - A Mechanism For Change?
We present data from two studies carried out in Wales-one on purchas-
ing plans and related documents, and one on contracting behaviour 9 -
which suggest that the picture may be a more static one, with cost
pressures in the acute sector blunting strategic policies to reallocate
resources. It is necessary to enter the caveat that our findings (like
Redmayne's) relate to health authorities, and not to general practice
fundholders, whose spending patterns may be different. Day and Klein2 °
argue that the reformed NHS incorporates two contradictory models of
contracting operating at these two levels. Our concern is with the health
authority commissioning model that was central to early conceptions of
the purchaser/provider split, and which continues to be of interest to other
countries contemplating "internal-market-style" reforms.
Wales is a region of 2.9 million people occupying 20,766 square
kilometers of mainland Britain. It elects representatives to the United
Kingdom Parliament but enjoys some limited administrative devolution.
The NHS in Wales is in many ways similar to that of England, although
there are some important organizational differences. The major contrasts
have been in the lack of a regional tier of management in Wales, which
has meant that District Health Authorities have taken on board roles
reserved until recently for Regional Health Authorities in England, and
in the existence of a separate Department of State in the form of the Welsh
Office. The Department of Health makes health policy for England and
Wales, which, however, is modified where necessary by the Welsh Office
Health Department at the all-Wales level. The Welsh Office has been
18. S. Redmayne, Re-shaping the NHS: NAHAT Research Paper No. 16 (Birmingham:
NAHAT, 1995), at p 21.
19. The first study was completed by Siobhan McLelland, the second by David Hughes and
Lesley Griffiths with Jean McHale.
20. Day & Klein, supra note 4.
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allocated both Departmental and Regional responsibilities, including a
role in formulating and disseminating policy.2' From 1982 to 1995 there
were nine DHAs, covering areas co-terminous with the existing local
authorities.2 2 There were also nine Family Health Services Authorities
(FHSAs), governing the work of general medical practitioners, dentists,
pharmacists and opticians. As the NHS reforms took shape, many DHAs
and FHSAs developed close working relationships and, following a
major service reorganization in April 1996, five unified Health Authori-
ties were created to replace the authorities that had previously existed.
The first of our two research projects, the study of health plans and
related documents, covers the period from 1992 to 1996. Documents
from the nine Welsh DHAs were analyzed together with those from the
five unified Health Authorities, which existed in shadow form in 1995/96.
For ease of reference, we will refer to both groups as HAs.
Documentary analysis offers the potential to explore the historical
development of policy making within a developing organization such as
a health authority .23 Health authorities publish a large volume of written
material, including the health plans, purchasing intentions, annual reports
and accounts examined in the research. However, the documents are
produced primarily to meet the requirements of the Welsh Office and
must be viewed within that political context. This poses some difficulties
for the researcher, since the documents are notable for both their rhetoric
and a prospective focus that at times precludes analysis of actual achieve-
ments. Thus many of the documents devote much textual space to the
description of planned changes together with general statements regard-
ing priorities, vision and strategy, rather than information on outcomes in
previous years. Where new developments are described, information on
funding is not always provided. However, the documents do offer the
researcher an opportunity to track policy making and implementation
over time, and across a number of organizations. The documents provide
a revealing "window" for examining national policy (including policy on
disadvantaged groups) and its translation into local health plans. They
also shed light on the impact of the internal market on service patterns, in
terms of the formulation of purchasing intentions and the agreement of
developments and disinvestments.
21. R. Levitt & A. Wall, The Reorganized National Health Service, 4th ed. (London:
Chapman and Hall, 1992).
22. The number of DHAs was reduced to eight in 1995/96 as an interim step before the major
reorganization of the following year.
23. N. Forster, "The analysis of company documentation" in C. Cassell and G. Symon, eds.,
Qualitative Analysis in Organizational Research (London: Sage, 1994); A.M. Rafferty,
"Historical Research" in D. Cormack, ed., The Research Process in Nursing, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
Blackwell Science, 1996).
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As purchasing matured, and at points mutated into health care "com-
missioning,' 2 4 it became clear that the internal market was perceived as
a mechanism by which patterns of service delivery could be changed, and
that purchasing was "the engine that would drive the reforms."25 It might
reasonably be expected therefore that one of the tasks for purchasers
would be to shift the focus of health care from the acute sector to primary
and community care, and to address the issue of access to services by
disadvantaged groups. This section seeks to establish the extent to which
this has occurred. We discuss a number of themes emerging from the
analysis of the documents which affected the allocation of resources
between sectors and services, and impacted upon service development
for disadvantaged groups.
One of the major influences on health policy during the period of the
study was a Welsh Office Initiative launched in 1989 to develop the
"Strategic Intent and Direction" (SID) for the NHS in Wales. SID was in
line with the World Health Organization (WHO) strategy "Health for All
by the Year 2000" and was developed before similar initiatives in other
countries, including the "Health of the Nation" in England. 26 The
initiative was formalized through a document bearing the same name
which identified the aim of the "Strategic Intent" thus:
Working with others, the NHS should aim to take the people of Wales into
the 21 st Century with a level of health on course to compare with the best
in Europe.27
The document goes on to set out the means by which the intent can be
secured. "Reassessment of the existing patterns of health care services
should be guided by three key themes of strategic direction focusing on:
health gain, people-centred services, and effective use of resources."28
SID identifies ten health gain areas where health could be improved.
These include cardiovascular disease and cancers (identified as the major
causes of death within Wales), and also emotional health and relation-
ships, injuries, respiratory illnesses, and healthy environments. Four
additional areas-mental handicap, mental distress and illness, maternal
and early child health, and physical and sensory disability and discom-
24. "Commissioning" is seen as a wider process than contracting, concerned with health
needs assessment, clinical effectiveness and population-based purchasing.
25. B. Mawhinney & D. Nichol, Purchasing for Health (London: NHS Management
Executive, 1994).
26. N. Whitehead, "Is it fair? Evaluating the Equity Implications of the NHS Reforms" in
R.Robinson & J. Le Grand,eds., Evaluating the NHS Reforms (London: King's Fund Institute,
1994).
27. Welsh Health Planning Forum, The Strategic Intent and Direction for the NHS in Wales
(Cardiff: Welsh Office, 1989) at 7.
28. Ibid. at 13.
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fort-cover the Cinderella groups that are our concern in this paper. The
document acknowledges that strategic planning "has tended to empha-
size and be driven by provider-related issues," with the consequence that
managers and clinicians have been distracted from the underlying pur-
pose of the NHS, which is "to secure better health for the population as
a whole."29 SID proposes "a new framework for planning" in which
Health Authorities will "formulate strategies which respond to these
challenges taking into account the important input of those involved at
community level."3°
The requirements of SID had an important role in shaping the purchas-
ing intentions of the HAs, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the
initiative. In 1992/93 HAs were required to produce lengthy "Local
Strategies for Health", which translated SID into a local context. Most
Local Strategies contain detailed objectives for improving health in the
areas identified for investment, supplemented in some cases by estimates
of resource commitments against health gain areas. However, the detail
of Local Strategies was not repeated on a regular basis and the format of
subsequent documents makes it difficult to establish how far these
objectives were actually achieved. This is confirmed by a 1996 National
Audit Office report evaluating the impact of SID which concluded that
the "impact on the delivery of health services to patients has been
relatively limited."'" Whilst the language of "health gain" maintains a
place in the documents of the mid-1990s (including those of the newly
configured HAs), its influence diminishes as the impact of other initia-
tives, such as the Patient's Charter, begins to be felt.
A second important theme which gathers strength as time passes is the
move towards "a primary care-led NHS." Many of the documents set the
goal of shifting the focus of the NHS in Wales from one dominated by the
acute hospital sector to one in which primary care plays a prominent role.
This is crystallized in the Welsh Office's 1995 document, "A Fresh
Start"32 which foreshadows a major change in the role of the new unified
HAs, with the main responsibility for purchasing gradually shifting to
GPs.
These policies figure prominently in HA health plans, and are reflected
,in limited organizational changes in areas such as the creation of GP
forums and the development of locality commissioning teams. However,
as with SID, there is little evidence of a significant reallocation of
29. Ibid. at 9.
30. Ibid. at 11.
31. U.K. National Audit Office, Improving Health in Wales (London: HMSO, 1996).
32. U.K. Welsh Office, A Fresh Start: First Report of the Changing Roles Group (Cardiff:
Welsh Office, 1995).
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resources towards primary care. Analysis of investments and
disinvestments suggests that the acute sector retains its position. This is
explicitly recognised by some HAs in statements such as the following:
acute services continue to consume the majority of resources;
... we expect to purchase broadly the same hospital services;
... many of the existing processes, systems and approaches will continue.
Where a shift does occur in this area it is predominantly in the provision
of locally based diagnostic and ambulatory services. Some of these
developments may be seen in the context of the rural population of large
areas of Wales, for whom geographical access to district general hospital
services is difficult." Others were situated in large urban centres and the
industrial areas of the South Wales valleys. The nature of developments
varies from one HA to another but includes: blood pressure monitoring
in a community pharmacy setting; locally provided ophthalmology,
dermatology and neurology services; locally provided general surgery;
locally available cardiac catheterization and foetal monitoring; and open
access services for GPs in physiotherapy, pathology and radiology. Many
of these developments involve the movement of traditional hospital
services into non-hospital settings so as to avoid the high costs of acute
hospital admission. However, it may be misleading to see these new
services as exclusively concerned with strengthening primary care. A
more important consideration may be that such developments will result
in reduced surgical waiting lists (a major concern in this period) thus
reducing pressure on acute hospitals.
The "health gain" concept directs attention to health care outcomes, as
opposed to processes, and by the mid-1990s the documents contain
references to clinical effectiveness and evidence-based medicine, which
by then commanded increasing interest in public health medicine circles.
Some HAs then moved further and introduced the concept of evidence-
based purchasing, by which evidence of clinical effectiveness will be
used to shape investment and disinvestment decisions. By 1994/95 seven
of the nine HAs included lists of excluded or restricted treatments in their
health plans, sometimes supporting these "disinvestments" by citing
evidence on effectiveness. Examples of "disinvestments" made on these
grounds in 1994/96 include: ear, nose and throat operations on children,
assisted reproduction, varicose vein operations, prostate operations, and
dilatation and curettage. The extent to which resources are released and
where they are reapplied is rarely identified. What is most notable is the
marginal and thus relatively uncontested nature of the treatments cur-
33. For example,the area covered by the former Powys HA does not contain a district general
hospital within its boundaries.
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rently affected by restrictions. It is difficult to predict which services
would be most vulnerable if the principles of evidence-based purchasing
were extended. Since ideas about clinical effectiveness, and the support-
ing methodology of randomized controlled trials and systematic reviews,
have been developed mainly in the context of acute interventions, it may
be difficult for some community services to establish their value in these
same terms.34 Yet it is also true that many mainstream acute procedures
have not been supported by controlled trials.35
The documents make frequent references to constraints on purchasing
arising from central policies on waiting times and cost economies. These
themes become more prominent towards the end of the research period,
and appear to have had a major impact on the ability of the HAs to change
patterns of service delivery. Waiting times "guarantees" are articulated
through the Patient's Charter, which was originally introduced in 1991
and endeavours to articulate patient rights and to set high national
standards of service.36 The Charter includes a range of general rights
regarding access to health care and individual delivery of health care.
Over time these have been supplemented by specific targets primarily
related to waiting times for appointments and urgent treatments in
hospital, and to community appointments, which have become increas-
ingly stringent. HAs were encouraged to produce local Charters, which
in some areas improve on the minimum standards required nationally.
The HA documents suggest that the achievement of Charter guaran-
tees affected patterns of priorities by advancing the claims of the services
most affected. Some HAs acknowledged that a tension existed between
the Charter-driven focus on wait times and the older health gain agenda:
If the service is to be responsive to the public's demands then we must
direct resources to reducing waiting lists and hence waiting times. How-
ever, it must be appreciated that this is not necessarily the same as meeting
health gain targets and health needs.
In addition to local Patient's Charters, all HAs have agreed local targets
based on other recent policy documents, such as Caring for the Future.37
34. R. Klein, "The NiS and the New Scientism: Solution or Delusion?" (1996) 89 Quarterly
J. Med. 85.
35. See: Sir Norman Browse,"Evidence to the House of Commons Health Committee, First
Report Session 1994-95" in U.K.H.C. Health Committee, Priority Setting in the NHS:
Purchasing. Vol II: Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, HC 134-I! (London: HMSO, 1995)
at 72.
36. U.K. Department of Health, The Patient's Charter and You (London: DOH, 1995);
J.Montgomery, "Patients First: the Role of Rights" in K.W.M. Fulford, S. Ersser & T. Hope,
Essential Practice in Patient-Centred Care (Oxford: Blackwell Science, 1996).
37. U.K. Welsh Office. NHS Directorate, Caring for the Future: The Pathfinder (Cardiff:
Welsh Office, 1992).
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These relate to such matters as childhood immunization rates, use of
generic prescription drugs, and cutting the percentage of overweight
adults. Only a small number have a community care dimension. How-
ever, an interesting example illustrates one HA's concern with the
sensitive issue of moving patients from free NHS beds to social care, the
availability of which may be means-tested:
No patient is to be discharged from hospital before arrangements have
been made to meet any continuing health or social care needs, having first
fully consulted with the patient, and with the patient's agreement or that
of his or her carers.
A predominant theme running through almost all documents was that
financial constraints generated at the centre were reducing the scope for
discretionary decision making at the local level. Welsh Office guidelines
required that strategic developments were normally "revenue neutral," so
that investments in new services had to be balanced by corresponding
savings, but the scope for reallocating resources between providers and
services was severely limited. Most new monies were channelled to
support the achievement of Charter targets (mainly through waiting list
initiatives) and the additional pressures placed on providers made it
difficult to reduce their allocations without damaging their ability to meet
the required performance targets. At the same time, Welsh Office
introduced annual "cost efficiency" and "cost improvement" targets,
which had the effect of increasing pressure on HA and trust budgets by
requiring them to improve productivity and reduce management costs.
These pressures were further compounded by rising provider costs
resulting from increasing numbers of emergency admissions. The sharp
upward trend of emergency admissions from the mid- 1990s onwards has
received much attention and continues to draw resources into the acute
sector.38
Some reference is made in all the documents to services or client
groups that can be located within the notion of the Cinderella services.
The main groups which figured in the documents are substance abusers,
mothers and children, and people with mental health problems and
learning disabilities. Concern with these groups derives in part from the
health gain areas specified in SID but can also be traced back to a number
of other policy directives. While some documents mention recent circulars
on Elderly Care, there is surprisingly little emphasis overall on service
38. S. Kendrick, "Emergency Admissions: What is driving the increase?" (1995) 105(545 1)
Health Serv. J. 26; N. Edwards, "The Wrong Side of the Bed" (1997) 107(5552) Health Serv.
J. 26.
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provision for older people. Reference is also made to two major policy
documents from the 1980s-the All Wales Strategy for Mental Health
and the All Wales Strategy for Mental Handicap-and, in contrast to the
elderly, all the HAs give significant attention to these client groups.
Consistent with the contemporary trend to encourage community care,
initiatives in mental illness and learning disabilities are concerned
primarily with the closure of large institutions and the provision of
alternative forms of care in the community. Some HAs have more
specific plans than others for this transfer of resources, although this can
usually be attributed to differences in the level of institutional provision
in the different areas. Specific investments identified by the HAs include:
increased use of community psychiatric nurses; expansion of the volun-
tary sector; expansion of advocacy services; developing services for the
elderly mentally ill; and annual checks for all adults with learning
disabilities and their carers. The concern for the reprovision of mental
health and learning disabilities services does diminish somewhat over the
years, reflecting perhaps a partial achievement of the objectives. How-
ever, the assurance of adequate provision for people with mental health
problems emerged as an important issue for many HAs in the mid- 1990s.
In reaching an overall assessment of purchasing patterns it is important
to recognize that developments represent only marginal changes in
service delivery, typically accounting for only a tiny percentage of HA
budgets. Although the nature of developments varies widely, there is no
evidence of any general movement of resources away from the acute
sector. Revenue developments tend to be phrased in the language of
health gain and therefore are often focused on the ten areas identified for
investment within SID. Again, this results in significant attention being
given to developments which aim to reduce the levels of cancers and
cardiovascular disease. Investments in other areas are remarkably dispar-
ate. Specific developments that might benefit disadvantaged groups are
often included under the rubric of health promotion, and include commu-
nity cardiac rehabilitation, needle exchange in community pharmacies,
and support for retired persons. Other developments presented in the
context of health gain include a Somali advocacy project, additional
community midwives and a number of community mothers and visitors
schemes. In later years one trend across several HAs is the concentration
on waiting times guarantees, a trend that again supports acute hospitals.
Early views of the role of HAs39 emphasised the need to forge "healthy
alliances" with other agencies, including social services departments and
39. U.K. Department of Health, The New Role of Health Authorities (London: DOH, 1990).
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voluntary organizations. It was thought that this would reinforce the
relationships between health and social care services and, in theory,
facilitate a "seamless" interface among organizations involved in local
service provision. However, while the language of "collaboration" and
"seamless services" is used in many of the documents, there is little detail
on the mechanisms needed to address these issues, or discussion of
current problems. One area that does receive limited attention is hospital
discharge, and, concomitantly, the desirability of improving communica-
tion between hospital staff and social care and primary care services. The
emphasis on hospital discharge may reflect concern with the pressures
touched on earlier. "Bed blocking," often by elderly patients, constrains
providers' ability to achieve guaranteed waiting times and to cope with
the rising number of emergency admissions. Investments in this area may
be directed as much at improving the efficiency of the secondary sector
as developing community services.
While the NHS reforms were intended to ensure that purchasers
secured real changes in patterns of services, the analysis of purchasing
documents reveals that any observable change has been predominantly at
the margins of service delivery. The bulk of new funding (in the form of
waiting list initiatives monies) has gone to increase the speed with which
patients are treated in acute hospitals, primarily to fulfil the waiting times
guarantees of the Patient's Charter. Visionary statements claiming a
move to a primary care led NHS have not been matched by transfers of
resources of services, and in any case does not give special attention to
vulnerable populations. The move towards purchasing on the basis of
clinical effectiveness again concentrates attention on the acute sector, and
establishes standards of effectiveness evidence that are difficult to apply
to community services.
III. Contracting and Resource Allocation: The "Alpha" Study
To understand why the allocation of resources between sectors and
services has changed so little we need to examine the nature of NHS
contracting. Here we draw on the findings of a socio-legal study of the
NHS in Wales.' The first phase of the research involved a case study of
40. D. Hughes, J. McHale & L. Griffiths, Contracts in the NHS: The Regulation ofan Imposed
Market, Final Report to ESRC (1996) [unpublished]; D. Hughes, J. McHale & L. Griffiths,
"Contracts in the NHS: Searching for a Model" in D. Campbell & P. Vincent-Jones, eds.,
Contract and Economic Organization: Socio-Legal Initiatives (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996);
D. Hughes, L. Griffiths & J.McHale, "Do Quasi-Markets Evolve? Institutional Analysis and
the NHS" (1997) 21 Cambridge J. Econ. 259.
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one HA, which we will call "Alpha," and its relations with providers in
the 1993-95 period. The researchers observed weekly meetings of the HA
core contracting team, as well as its negotiation and monitoring meetings
with acute hospitals and a mixed mental health/community trust (ap-
proximately 80 meetings in all). The case study was supplemented by
interviews in late 1995 with contracts staff in all nine Welsh HAs and
twenty-two trusts involved in the 1994/95 contracting round.
The findings from the case study correspond closely with the picture
presented earlier. A Local Strategy for Health, prepared in 1991 as a
response to SID, had set the long-term objective of shifting resources
from acute to primary and community services, by such means as greater
use of day surgery and more sophisticated diagnostic equipment outside
hospitals. However, core performance indicator data returned to the
Welsh Office reveals that Alpha's expenditures on community health
services and learning disability services as a percentage of total health
authority expenditure remained constant in the 1994-97 period, while the
percentage spent on mental health services fell slightly.4 The pattern of
new service developments also shows the acute sector holding its own. In
1994/95 secondary care took £ 1.9 million of the £2.8 million available for
developments, including acute activity in intensive therapy units, renal
analysis and medical care (as well as a modest allocation for forensic
psychiatry placements). In contrast, less than £0.7 million was directed
at improvements in primary and community health services, including
more community nurses, support for open access radiography, physio-
therapy and endoscopy, shared care in rheumatology, creating a primary
care development fund for equipment in GP premises, speech therapy for
special needs, and outreach stroke rehabilitation. Disinvestments af-
fected all sectors, with savings in the acute sector (cessation of dilatation
and curettage in women under forty, and deduction in length of stay in
hospital for cardiac and inguinal hernia patients) balanced by reductions
in hospital-based services for people with learning disabilities, less
antenatal care for low-risk mothers, and fewer routine school medical
examinations. Of the traditional Cinderella groups only those with
learning disabilities appear to have been specifically targeted for invest-
ment, though improved generic services may well have helped to support
these groups in the community.
We now turn to consider how far these issues become manifest in the
contracting process. Contracting follows a cycle based on the financial
41. Unfortunately, consolidated figures for all Welsh HAs for this period are not yet
available.
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year, during which the focus shifts between the tasks of negotiation,
drafting and monitoring. In the NHS contracts are "the subject of
agreement between the purchaser and provider and ... specify the nature
and level of service which the provider is expected to give and the basis
on which the cost of those services will be reimbursed. 42 Such contracts
also typically contain clauses specifying information requirements, ar-
rangements for monitoring, dispute settlement, redress in the event of
non-performance, and provision for force majeure.43 In Alpha, contract-
ing is the responsibility of a core contracting team, headed by the Director
of Finance, but also including additional finance, planning, and profes-
sional staff. The core contract team liaises with the health authority's
senior executive team, and with a subcommittee of the team known as the
"disinvestments group," in order to translate the agreed contracting
strategy into contracts negotiated with providers.
Recent British studies suggest that contracting in the NHS has more of
the character of an administrative process than true market behaviour.
4
Arrangements for NHS contracting were super-imposed upon structures
and relationships surviving from the pre-1991 system, which signifi-
cantly shaped the way contracting evolved. The bureaucratic mecha-
nisms used to manage the internal market have been well documented in
the academic commentary.45 The central departments issue guidance and
directives to regulate many of the basic parameters of "market" ex-
change, such as contract time cycles, pricing rules, dispute settlement
arrangements, and rules for capital charging and borrowing. Targets for
efficiency savings which require health authorities to secure the same
services for a real-terms reduction in cost have been imposed every year,
and are reflected in contracts with providers. Over time the central
departments have changed the framework of rules to control the evolution
of the "market," and defined the conditions under which they will
intervene to prevent unfair practices. 6 While purchasers and providers
42. U.K. Department of Health, Working for Patients: Funding and Contracts for Hospital
Services (Working Paper 2) (London: HMSO, 1989) at 7.
43. T. Jost et al.,"The British health service reforms, the American health care revolution and
purchaser-provider contracts" (1995) 20 J. Health Pol. Policy & Law 885; P. Spurgeon, et al.,
"The Experience of Contracting in Health Care" in Flynn & Williams, eds., supra note 6.
44. C. Bennett & E. Ferlie, Managing Crisis and Change in Health Care: The Organizational
Response to HIV/AIDS (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994); D. Hughes, J. McHale &
L. Griffiths, "Settling NHS Contract Disputes: Formal and Informal Pathways" in Flynn &
Williams, eds., supra note 6.
45. D. Hughes, "Health Policy: Letting the Market Work?" (1993) 5 Soc. Policy Rev. 104;
J. Le Grand, "Internal Market Rules OK" (1994) 309 Br. Med. J. 1596; J. Montgomery, Health
Care Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
46. U.K. National Health Service Executive (NHSE), The Operation of the NHS Internal
Market: Local Freedoms, National Responsibilities (London: DOH, 1994).
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usually conclude contracts within the terms of official guidance and
without the involvement of the central departments, there is evidence
that, in extreme cases, they have intervened to safeguard the position of
individual trusts.
47
Under the NHS short-term planning system, which ended in 1991,
annual revenue allocations by HAs to hospitals were rolled forward from
year to year, with small adjustments for inflation and new developments.
Changes in clinical services depended on "development monies," which
accounted for only a tiny percentage of total expenditure. The NHS
reforms were intended to allow purchasers and providers to move away
from historic funding patterns by using contracts to specify what would
and would not be purchased from one contract to the next. Yet critics
argued that this system perpetuated unfairness by basing current budgets
on the budgets allocated in past years.
Rather than funding hospitals through a block revenue allocation, the
new policy required HAs to buy services at hospitals' published tariffs
(usually based on an average price per specialty). This was intended to
remove anomalies arising from past over-or under-funding of particular
services by ensuring that prices were close to actual costs. 48 However, it
was widely acknowledged that a move to tariff-based contracting would
involve significant short-term adjustments that might disadvantage some
HAs and trusts, and this change was resisted by many Finance Directors.
By 1994/95 seven of the nine Welsh HAs, including Alpha, still based
their main contracts on the quantum of costs carried over from the
previous year, with limited negotiation regarding "investments" and
"disinvestments." Trusts remained within the rules by publishing tariffs,
but these were usually calculated retrospectively in the light of the
available contract sum. This practice, known as "roll-over contracting,"
ensured a degree of financial stability for health authorities. However, it
meant that contracting was little different from the old-style revenue
allocation process, so that problems remained in reallocating resources
between services. A report from an advisory committee on purchasing
ethics, appended to Alpha's 1994/95 Health Plan, notes that the debate on
priorities and associated investments and disinvestments, affected only
around one percent of health authority resources.
47. U.K.H.C. Welsh Affairs Committee, Morriston Hospital/lIcheyd Morgannwg: A Case
Study of the Working of the Internal Market (London: House of Commons, 1997).
48. Hospitals were instructed that contract prices should equal costs, calculated on a "full-
cost" basis, with no planned cross-subsidization between services, specialties or procedures.
See: U.K. Department of Health, Department of Health Circular (Finance Directorate Letter)
FDL(92)49, Annex A (1992).
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Another feature of the new contracting system that militated against
the reallocation of resources between services was that most clinical
services were purchased in the aggregate rather than by procedure. NHS
contracts take three forms: block contracts involve provision of a service
for a fixed price regardless of volume;4 9 cost and volume contracts
provide for an adjustment of price if volume is above or below an
indicative level agreed in the contract; and cost-per-case contracts
specify an agreed price for each case treated. Welsh HAs use cost-per-
case contracts only for occasional specialized or high-cost procedures.
The pattern in Alpha, as in most other Welsh HAs, has been that contracts
with main acute providers took a cost-and- volume form, while a block
contract was used to buy services from the mental health/community unit.
Block contracts had been the predominant contract form in the early
1990s, largely because of the administrative burden associated with
launching the internal market and the limitations of existing information
systems. While acute hospitals were able to develop more sophisticated
contracts as time went by, providers of community health services found
this more difficult. Where acute hospitals mostly used "deaths and
discharges," "day cases," and "new inpatient attendances" as the units for
specifying activity in contracts, community units typically used staff
"contacts" as their main contract currency. Given the imprecise relation-
ship among "contacts," clinical care and outcomes, and the consequent
problems of costing "contacts" of different kinds, most health authorities
continued to purchase community health services on a block basis. At
face value it might be assumed that more precise information on case mix
in acute hospitals contracts would enable a HA to be more explicit about
what it was purchasing and not purchasing, and disinvest from services
offering little benefit. In practice, however, those hospitals that had
moved furthest in this direction used case-mix information to try to
establish underfunding of services and push for additional revenue.
Alpha resisted attempts by an acute trust to renegotiate its contract so as
to reflect the complex case mix said to result from the presence of a
number of subregional specialties on the site, but was forced to concede
that underfunding did exist in respect of orthopaedics and ITU services.
The duty of HAs to carry out health needs assessments was considered
by many commentators to be one of the major advances introduced by the
purchaser/provider split, and an important mechanism for shifting re-
sources. Alpha's work on health needs assessments centred primarily on
49. By the mid-1990s sophisticated block contracts, specifying floors and ceilings within
which the fixed price applied, were becoming common in England, though less so in Wales.
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a general health status survey (using Short-Form 36 Health Survey)
carried out under the direction of the public health medicine department
in 1993. This exercise (like SID) identified high death rates from cancer
and ischaemic heart disease as the areas with greatest scope for improve-
ment and also noted a specific deficit in oral health. However, health
needs assessments received less attention than "clinical effectiveness,"
which was very prominent in Wales because of the emphasis placed on
"health gain." In line with SID, "health gain working parties" were
established in the ten designated areas. Objectives set for mental illness
and learning disabilities included a reduction in institutional care, open
access to community mental health teams, development of community
services for challenging behaviours and reduction of preventable illness
in people with learning disabilities.
The research found that these initiatives were having only a limited
impact on the contracting process. The activities of the core contracting
team were not closely coordinated with discussions taking place in the
"disinvestments group," which centred more explicitly on clinical effec-
tiveness and health gain issues, and it was not until late in the research
period that the HA identified this problem and took steps to improve
liaison.
These issues fed through into weekly contract team meetings mainly
in the form of occasional discussions of clinical effectiveness evidence in
respect of service developments originating from providers, mostly in the
acute sector. From time to time the team found itself needing to decide
whether to buy new services offered by a trust by authorizing a contract
variation. Certain of these developments had not been anticipated by the
HA and involved additional costs which officers sought to resist. For
example, there were protracted discussions regarding the purchase of
dexa scans. Although Alpha's public health medicine physicians were
sceptical about the benefits of this new technology for assessing bone
density, a number of GP fundholders were already purchasing it for their
patients. This made the health authority vulnerable to the charge that it
was perpetuating a two-tier service in which non-fundholder patients
were disadvantaged. Alpha received a letter from the Welsh Office
Health Department requiring it to avoid a position where services
purchased by fundholders were not available to patients covered by
health authority contracts. The HA decided to extend its contract to buy
dexa scans, but also opened discussions with GPs to attempt to obtain
district-wide agreement on purchasing new procedures.
Health needs assessments and clinical effectiveness were overshad-
owed by pressures coming through from providers and from the Welsh
Office Health Department. The magnitude of the administrative burden
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associated with the implementation of contracting is hard to overstate.
The core team had to cope not only with the work of negotiating and
monitoring contracts, but also with the steady stream of official guidance
on contracting policy, and problems arising from the financial instability
of some providers. Consequently the team found itself constantly pulled
towards "fire-fighting," rather than the development work needed to
improve its purchasing role.
The main pressures from providers involved demands to fund in-
creased activity in certain acute specialties, particularly activity associ-
ated with emergency medical admissions. Emergency admissions in
Alpha's contracts rose by more than thirty percent in 1993/95, reflecting
a trend affecting the NHS nationally. Alpha included additional emer-
gency admissions as a designated service development in 1994/95, and
was forced to allocate additional monies from its contingency reserve to
address this need.
The strongest pressures coming from the Welsh Office centred on
achieving targets set out in the national Patient's Charter, as well as
centrally-imposed management economies implemented through a re-
duction in the HA's revenue allocation. At this time the Patient's Charter
had a very high political profile, with the Government seeing reduced
waiting lists as evidence of the success of the (still controversial) NHS
reforms. The Charter tended to displace other strategic and contracting
policy initiatives to the extent that it became the focal point for Welsh
Office monitoring of HA activities. The Welsh Office insisted that
Charter guarantees, particularly guarantees affecting surgical waiting
times, must be strictly enforced. Substantial non-recurring monies were
allocated to enable hospitals to control waiting lists, and HAs came under
heavy pressure to ensure that the additional funding had the desired result.
Alpha responded by writing maximum waiting times into its contracts,
together with substantial financial penalties for non-performance. Pro-
viders were required to provide monthly information returns which gave
details of patients nearing wait times limits, and were subject to additional
financial penalties for missing information returns. These penalty clauses
were deeply unpopular with providers, and proved difficult to enforce
with two specialist hospitals who threatened to treat Alpha's patients on
an "ECR-only" basis.5" Nevertheless, Alpha was able to insist that
penalties remain in its contracts with main providers, and levied them on
50. While HAs purchase most activity through negotiated contracts, they buy certain.
additional procedures as extra-contractual referrals (ECRs) at providers' published ECR
tariffs.
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a number of occasions during the research period. One major acute
provider complained that the emphasis on Charter standards was forcing
doctors to treat patients who had been on the waiting lists for extended
periods ahead of more clinically urgent cases, and was successful in
getting extra money to deal with urgent orthopaedic cases not covered by
the Charter. The overall effect of the Patient's Charter, with its emphasis
on surgical wait times, was undoubtedly to channel additional monies to
acute providers. They benefited not only from non-recurring waiting list
initiative monies, but also from extra activity purchased under Alpha's
main contracts in mid-year to deal with waiting list hot spots.
One secondary effect of the pressures coming through from acute
hospitals is that almost all serious contract disputes involve acute provid-
ers. During the research period Alpha was embroiled in a long-running
dispute with a newly formed acute trust, which clearly illustrates the
difficulties that HAs face in reducing the value of their contracts with
acute hospitals. Early in the financial year money is deducted from the
base budgets of HAs according to a calculation carried out by the Welsh
Office so as to provide separate budgets for newly created GP fundholders.
Alpha and the trust had signed a contract which specified that the final
contract sum would be agreed in a contract variation when the amount of
the allocation to "new wave" fundholders was confirmed. It had been
assumed that the new fundholders would enter contracts with the trust
which reflected patient flows in previous years, and that this would leave
its financial position largely unaffected. However, the Welsh Office, with
HA advice, allocated a larger sum to fundholders than expected, and the
trust found that the fundholders were electing to spend some of this
money elsewhere, so that it faced a substantial reduction in contract
income. The trust responded by reallocating its fixed costs to enable it to
claim a higher proportion of overheads from Alpha, as well as seeking
payment for the clinical activity not now covered by contracts. The two
organizations were unable to agree upon a contract variation and the
dispute went to conciliation. Alpha was criticized by the conciliators for
not advising the trust of the change in the basis of the fundholder
allocation and for poor communication as the problem developed, and
was required to make good a large proportion of the trust's lost revenue.
It is unclear how much of the shortfall in fundholder contracts reflected
a reallocation of monies to non-acute services as opposed to other acute
hospitals, but the trust was able to use conciliation to force the HA to
maintain its contract income near the expected level. As a result of these
events, the trust ended the 1994/95 financial year with a small surplus,
leaving the HA with a deficit.
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While Alpha's two largest acute providers both achieved NHS trust
status during the research period, the main community mental health
provider was still "directly managed" by the HA. The relationship
between the two bodies was less adversarial than that between Alpha and
the acute trusts, and there were suggestions that the HA was manoeuvring
to secure the financial viability of the unit and prepare it for trust status.
Plans were announced for a merger with a smaller acute hospital, which
would be restructured to provide a limited range of acute and community
health services at a new site, with transfer of other acute specialties to the
two existing acute trusts. This accorded with the long-term strategy of
moving resources from secondary to community care, though the build-
ing of the new hospital would depend on securing Private Finance
Initiative funding from outside the NHS.5i The planned development was
still some years ahead, but a number of other service changes were
canvassed to ensure that the new trust had a viable portfolio of services.
There was a proposal to consolidate child health services in the new trust
by amalgamating acute paediatrics with community child health services.
However, this resulted in intense opposition from paediatricians, who
were unwilling to leave the acute trust. As a compromise the health
authority devised an unusual arrangement whereby the new trust would
contract for all child health services, but then sub-contract the acute
component of this work to the acute trust. Consequently, the paper value
of the new trust's contract tended to overstate its actual income. Again
these events illustrate the problems in moving services out of powerful
acute hospitals, specifically the ability of professionals to water down
changes to the point where the scale of actual resource shifts is much
reduced.
The Alpha case study suggests that early hopes that contracting would
transform patterns of resource allocation in the NHS were overly optimis-
tic. The reformed service has needed to cope with many of the same
pressing administrative and resource issues that affected the old system.
While policy analysts have been preoccupied with the changed incentive
structures and responsibilities created by the purchaser/provider split, we
maintain that, in this context, contracting is not simply an economic or
technical planning mechanism. Inevitably it becomes a tool in the
political process of managing the NHS, something which was of crucial
importance to Government in a period when the internal market could not
be allowed to fail. Although contracting had been linked to activities such
as health needs assessments and evidence-based purchasing, which
51. The PFI aims to encourage private enterprises to finance new developments in the NHS
and other public services for which they receive a normal commercial return.
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might more closely match services to the needs of local populations, this
decentralizing agenda was displaced by pressures from the centre to
increase efficiency and demonstrate measurable performance improve-
ments. The Patient's Charter, in particular, undoubtedly reduced surgi-
cal waiting lists, but also skewed clinical priority towards a subset of
targeted patients and ensured that resources remained concentrated in the
acute sector.
IV. Patients' Rights to Resources After the NHS Reforms
Although the new system of contracting has not diverted resources away
from the acute sector, there remains the possibility that the NHS reforms
have made it easier for patients disadvantaged by the underfunding of
services, including Cinderella services, to seek redress in the courts. In
this section we change tack and consider the wider legal context. The
question of patient rights after the NHS reforms has occasioned consid-
erable scholarly commentary, and our brief discussion focuses primarily
on a small number of recent cases in which the established judicial
approach to NHS resource allocation cases has come under scrutiny. We
argue that a comparison of cases from the 1980s and 1990s reveals some
evidence of a shift in judicial attitudes, though not one that has so far
produced tangible benefits for patients in terms of remedies.
There are, of course, important differences between the U.K. and
Canadian contexts. The U.K. does not have a written constitution, or
anything comparable to s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.2 Moreover the scope for litigation alleging failure to carry
out statutory duties appears more restricted, largely because of the
absence of a clear statutory basis for a right to treatment and the relative
restraint of British judges in cases involving the allocation of health care
resources. Despite the fundamental changes introduced by the NHSCCA,
it left the legal framework affecting rights to health care services largely
untouched. While ss. 1-3 of the National Health Service Act 197753
52. See: D. Longley, Health Care Constitutions (London: Cavendish, 1996); E. Colvin,
"Section Seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 560;
M. Jackson,"The protection of welfare rights under the Charter" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257.
However, as this paper was in preparation the U.K. Labour Government, elected in May 1997,
announced its intention to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into
domestic law via a Bill of Rights. There is some debate among legal commentators as to
whether this will be based on a Canadian or New Zealand model, in terms of the relative roles
of the judiciary and Parliament. See: F. Gibbs, "First Bill of Rights since 1689 will give courts
new powers" The Times (15 May 1997).
53. 1977, c.49.
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require the Secretary of State for Health to provide or secure the provision
of comprehensive health care, these duties are limited by the proviso in
s. 3(1) that the Secretary of State is bound to provide services only "to
such extent as he considers necessary to meet all reasonable require-
ments." NHS contracts have no direct effect on the legal position of
patients, since s. 4(3) of the NHSCCA prevents their enforcement as
contracts in law and, even if this were not the case, considerations of
privity of contract would further restrict the accessibility of a remedy. Nor
do the standards and guarantees provided under the Patient's Charter, so
prominent in our empirical studies, create legally enforceable rights
4.5
Section 47 of the NHSCCA requires local authorities to assess the needs
of persons who may need community care services, but leaves consider-
able discretion regarding the provision of services. Local authorities are
required only to decide what services to provide in the light of the
assessment. As emerged in one case considered below, any stricter duty
to provide services would depend on the provisions of earlier enactments
incorporated in the statutory regime created by the 1990 Act.
The British Secretary of State for Health, Kenneth Clarke, was
concerned that an Act with contracting as its centrepiece should not
become "a lawyer's charter and paradise."55 Consequently the Govern-
ment made provision in the NHSCCA to prevent NHS contracts from
being enforced in law .56 However, many commentators predicted that the
reforms would lead to more cases in the courts, including actions
regarding patient rights to care 7 It was argued that the separation of
purchasers and providers would make conflicts of interests between the
parties more visible, and the basis of decisions more amenable to scrutiny.
Agreements for the provision of clinical services would become more
formal and explicit, so that procedural aspects of purchasing might come
more to the fore. Beyond this, greater organizational decentralization
would mean that resource allocation decisions would often be taken by
managers in health authorities and trusts rather than by Ministers making
policy for the NHS as a whole.
Patients or relatives harmed by such decisions might seek redress
through either public law or private law actions. Academic lawyers
speculated a good deal about the form litigation might take. One route
54. See Montgomery, supra note 36.
55. U.K., H.C., Parliamentary Debates, Standing Committee E on the National Health
Service and Community Care Bill, col. 349 (23 January 1990).
56. NHSCCA, s. 4.3.
57. D. Longley, "Diagnostic Dilemmas: Accountability in the National Health Service"
[1990] Pub. L. 527; J. M. Jacob, "Lawyers go to Hospital" [1991] Pub. L. 255; C. Newdick,
"Rights to NHS Resources After the 1990 Act" (1993) 1 Med. L. Rev. 53.
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open to plaintiffs, the tort of breach of statutory duty, appears to be ruled
out in the NHS context because of the unwillingness of the British courts
to permit actions for breach of duty to provide statutory welfare ser-
vices.5 8 Interest among commentators centred more on the prospects of
negligence actions brought under general tort law principles. Such an
action would need to establish that a patient had suffered harm because
a health authority or NHS trust carried out its functions with insufficient
care. In two cases involving hospitalized patients in the pre-1991 NHS,
it was held that lack of resources was not a sufficient defence against
allegations that treatment practices were unsafe.59 Some legal commen-
tators believed that, following the reforms, a health authority might be
vulnerable to allegations of negligence if the level of its contracts failed
to meet the needs of its resident population, particularly in the extreme
case in which no contract was let for an entire service.6' If this were not
so, NHS contracts might, in a situation where a trust cut costs and clinical
standards, compromise the standard of care required by the law of
negligence.6 To date, however, these arguments have not been tested in
the courts, and we suspect that many of the scenarios discussed are too
unlikely to be of much concern to practising lawyers.
While many commentators predicted that private law actions would
offer the best prospect of success for patients, the most significant
decisions of the 1990s have undoubtedly been in the public law arena,
though the benefits they offer plaintiffs may ultimately be severely
limited. The principles applied by the courts in dealing with allegations
that the NHS has failed to perform its statutory duty by not providing
adequate resources were established in R. v. Secretary of State for Social
Services, West Midlands RHA and Birmingham AHA (Teaching), ex p.
Hincks.6 2 This case involved four Staffordshire patients who had been on
the waiting list for orthopaedic surgery for some years, and who were
facing further delays in treatment because a scheme to improve ortho-
paedic services, previously approved by the Department of Health, had
been shelved as an economy measure. The applicants sought a declara-
tion that the Secretary of State was failing to fulfil his duty under s. 3(1)
of the National Health Services Act 1977 to provide comprehensive
health services. The Court of Appeal held that the duty was not absolute;
58. See Montgomery, supra note 45 at 71.
59. Bull v. Devon Health Authority (1989) 1 Lancet 738, text of judgment unreported; Knight
v. Home Office, [1990] 3 All E.R 237.
60. Jacob, supra note 57.
61. Newdick,supra note 57.
62. [1980] 1 B.M.L.R. 93 [hereinafter Hincks].
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it was necessarily limited by the implied qualification "within the
resources available." Lord Denning M.R. stated that the funds for the
NHS were voted by Parliament and that the service had to do the best it
could within the total allocation set: "The Secretary of State says that he
is doing the best he can with the financial resources available to him, and
I do not think he can be faulted in the matter." 3
Similar issues were raised in two further cases precipitated by long
cardiac surgery waiting lists in a Central Birmingham Health Authority
in 1987. The cases came to have wider significance because, according
to many commentators, the media attention they engendered precipitated
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's decision to authorize the major
review of the NHS that culminated in the 1991 reforms. In R. v. Central
Birmingham Health Authority, ex p. Walker,64 the applicants again
argued that the decision not to offer surgery to correct a congenital heart
defect in an infant ran counter to the duty to provide comprehensive
health care. However, Macpherson J. held that the case "was not truly an
attack on the actual decision made ... [but] a general criticism of the
decisions as to the staffing and financing of the health service ... Those
of course are questions which are of enormous public interest and
concern, but they are questions to be raised, answered and dealt with
outside the court. '65 The judge's comment that the patient's life was not
presently in danger led some commentators to infer that he might have
granted an order if a life-threatening emergency had been involved. In R.
v. Central Birmingham Health Authority, exp. Collier,66 a case involving
a neonate whose condition was more serious, it became clear that this was
not so. On appeal Brown L.J. held that, even where there is immediate
danger to life, the legal principles are the same.
One difficulty for the applicants in these cases was that their com-
plaints could be construed as being in essence that a HA faced with severe
resource constraints had decided to withhold treatment from one patient
rather than another. In both cases the judges followed the established
principle that a reviewing court must not substitute its own view of the
way discretion should have been exercised for that of the original
authority. Thus in exparte Walker, Sir John Donaldson M.R. emphasised
that it was not for the court "to substitute its own judgment for the
judgment of those who are responsible for the allocation of resources,"
63. Ibid. at 95, per Denning M.R.
64. [1987] 3 B.M.L.R. 32 [hereinafter Walker].
65. Ibid. at 34, per Macpherson J.
66. C.A. [1988] [unreported] [hereinafter Collier].
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since this might simply have the consequence of diverting resources from
one patient to another.67
While these cases suggest that judicial review on the statutory duty
under section 3 alone will not succeed, they leave some uncertainty about
the prospects of an action alleging unreasonableness. An important facet
of exparte Walker was Sir John Donaldson's acknowledgment that: "[i]f
other circumstances arose in this case or another case it might be different,
because the jurisdiction does exist .. . [b]ut it has to be used extremely
sparingly."68 The Master of the Rolls stated that the court "could only
intervene where it was satisfied that there was aprimafacie case, not only
of failing to allocate resources in the way which others would think that
resources should be allocated, but of a failure to allocate resources to an
extent that was Wednesbury .. .unreasonable."69 This reaffirmed the
orthodox position that an authority breaches its public law duty only if in
making a decision it fails to take account of matters that should have been
considered, or it takes account of matters that it should not have consid-
ered, or it acts unreasonably to the point of irrationality.
In the NHS of the 1980s few cases involved circumstances that met
these conditions and the public law route was widely perceived to offer
little chance of success. Longley, in a review of the position following the
NHSCCA, drew unfavourable comparisons with the 'hard look' doctrine
of American administrative law.7" In the U.S. courts, judges have been
willing to infer remedies consistent with the general intention of legisla-
tion, and to insist that health providers furnish information on the
procedural basis of decisions. Longley argued that the 1991 NHS re-
forms, by making resource allocation more transparent, might open the
way for movement in this direction.
Seven years on, there are indications that judges have become more
willing to investigate reasons for decisions. R. v. Cambridge Health
Authority, exp. B7 was a landmark case because it demonstrated that the
courts might yet overturn resource allocation decisions on "unreason-
67. Walker, supra note 63 at 35, per Donaldson M.R. For a similar decision see Re J (a minor)
(wardship: medical treatment), [1992] 4 All E.R. 614.
68. Walker, supra note 63 at 35, per Donaldson M.R.
69. Ibid. at 35. The Wednesbury principles, the usual starting point for the review of
administrative discretion in the British courts, originate in Lord Greene's judgment in
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation, [ 1948] K.B. 223. They set
out the circumstances in which a court may intervene to quash an administrative decision as
unlawful. A decision may be deemed unreasonable on the grounds of (a) disregard of
relevancies, (b) consideration of irrelevancies, or (c) irrationality or perverseness. See
M.Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (Chichester: Wiley, 1995) at 267.
70. Longley, supra note 57.
71. [1995] 1 F.L.R. 1055 [hereinafter B].
"Cinderella" Services in the NHS Internal Market
ableness" grounds. The case involved 13, a ten year-old girl with lympho-
blastic leukaemia who had had an unsuccessful bone marrow trans-
plant.72 Doctors in Cambridge and London considered that further
treatment would be ineffective, but B's father found other experts who
believed that another course of chemotherapy might bring benefits. If B's
condition improved, a second bone marrow transplant might be possible,
though at a total cost of approximately £75,000. The Cambridge Health
Authority was asked to purchase the treatment, which could have been
funded from its extra-contractual referral budget, but declined to do so.
The Authority wrote to the father stating that the decision had been made
after taking account of available clinical information, the content of
Department of Health guidance on experimental and unproven treat-
ments, and the child's best interests.
In the subsequent High Court proceedings, counsel for the HA stated
that these considerations, and particularly the medical advice, had led the
HA to conclude that the "substantial expenditure on treatment with such
a small prospect of success would not be an effective use of resources."
Laws J. granted an application for certiorari and quashed the decision,
asking the HA to reconsider the case. He criticized the HA for accepting
the medical view of what constituted B's best interests without separately
consulting the family, and for not explaining the priorities that led them
to refuse funding. Laws J. held that: "The ordinary Wednesbury principle
produces the result, on the facts here, that the respondents have at least
failed to have regard to a relevant consideration, namely B's family's
views- which are the legitimate surrogate of her own - as to whether the
proposed treatment would be in her best interests." 73 More fundamen-
tally, he questioned whether a different test of reasonableness might not
be required in cases which concerned the right to life: "I entertained the
greatest doubt whether the decisive touchstone for the legality of the
respondents' decision was the crude Wednesbury bludgeon. It seemed to
me that the fundamental right, the right to life, was engaged in this
case." 74 Laws J. referred to recent decisions, arising from the European
Convention on Human Rights, which established the principle that a
public body could not infringe fundamental rights unless it could show "a
substantial objective justification on public interest grounds .'7 Laws J.
72. "B" was subsequently named as Jaymee Bowen.
73. B, supra note 71 at 12, per Laws J.
74. Ibid. at 12.
75. Ibid. Laws J. made reference to Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept.,
[ 1987] 1 All E.R. 940 [hereinafter Bugdaycay]; and to Brind v. Secretary of Statefor the Home
Dept., [ 1991 ] 1 All E.R. 720 [hereinafter Brind].
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held that this principle required the HA to put forward reasons for the
decision, including an explanation of the priorities that led it to decline to
fund treatment, the authority having done no more here than "toll the bell
of tight resources."76 The decision was quickly overturned by the Court
of Appeal, which reasserted the public law orthodoxy. Bingham M.R.
said that it would be unrealistic to expect the HA to provide accounts
relating to its financial priorities for scrutiny by the court. He did not
explicitly address the requirement for "substantial objective justifica-
tion," but, on the narrower question of Wednesbury reasonableness,
found on the facts that the health authority had taken the wishes of the
family into account.
Despite this ruling, the High Court judgment provides an important
indication of trends in judicial review that may yet affect health care
allocation. The issue may be set in the context of a series of recent
decisions in which the courts have explored the standard for Wednesbury
review. In Bugdaycay and Brind, Lord Bridge said that the more substan-
tial the interference with human rights, the more the court will require by
way of justification before it is satisfied that the decision is reasonable.
Sir John Laws' decision reflected the approach that he had advocated in
his earlier publications,77 specifically his argument that it is open to the
courts to apply the principles of the European Convention on Human
Rights incrementally through the development of case law, on the
grounds that these principles embody values inherent in English jurispru-
dence.78 While such an approach has been supported in a number of first
instance judgments, all have been overturned on appeal. In a further
recent case where the standard for Wednesbury unreasonableness was a
central issue, Bingham M.R. re-stated the traditional position:
The greater the policy context of a decision, and the more remote the
subject matter of a decision from ordinary judicial experience, the more
hesitant the court must necessarily be in holding a decision to be irrational
.... Where decisions of a policy-laden, esoteric or security-based nature
are in issue even greater caution than normal must be shown in applying
the test, but the test itself is sufficiently flexible to cover all situations.79
76. Ibid.
77. Sir John Laws, "Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Human Rights?" [ 1993]
Pub. L. 59.
78. Recent plans to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic
law are likely to have a similareffect. It has been claimed that this will transform English public
law from a sovereignty-derived system of rules to a more rights-based constitutionalism, and
obligate the courts to interpret domestic law to conform with international human rights norms.
See M. Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997).
79. R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex p. Smith (1995), 145 N.L.J. Rep. 1689 (C.A.).
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The argument for a more stringent test of reasonableness in the context
of decisions affecting the "right to life" intersects with the issue of reasons
for decisions in administrative law. At present there is only a limited
statutory duty to provide reasons, coupled with common law authority
requiring reasons in certain defined situations.80 However, in some recent
cases judges have decided that reasons should be given on the general
principles of natural justice and fairness. Thus in Doody, Lord Mustill
noted the trend towards greater "transparency" in administrative deci-
sions, and suggested that refusal to give reasons raised questions about
fairness which needed to be resolved on the facts of the case.8' While
there is still no general duty to provide reasons, this principle may be
gradually undermined as fairness considerations are acknowledged in
more judgments. From this perspective, the B case may be the starting
point for a wider debate on the rights-based arguments and the limits of
Wednesbury reasonableness in the health service context.82
While B, like Hincks, Walker and Collier, involved issues of access to
hospital services, an important case from the 1990s related to community
care. A group action was brought on behalf of clients affected by the
decisions of a number of Social Services Departments to cease providing
home care services they could no longer afford.83 The Government had
introduced a Special Transitional Grant to meet the increased financial
burden falling on Local Authorities, but in 1994/95 the basis of the
allocation was changed, leaving many authorities with large shortfalls
against planned expenditure. Section 47 of the NHSCCA confers a right
to have needs assessed, but does not guarantee that services will be
provided. However, a person assessed as disabled falls into a special
category, since the Act triggers the duty to decide on the services to be
provided under s. 4 of the Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and
Representation) Act 1986,84 which in turn requires the provision of
services under s. 2 of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970
80. For a discussion see P.P. Craig,Administrative Law, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1994) at 310-15.
81. R. v. Secretary of State for Home Dept., ex. p. Doody, [1993] 3 All E.R. 92.
82. See R. James & D. Longley, "Judicial Review and Tragic Choices: Ex Parte B" [1995]
Pub. L. 367; A. Parkin, "Allocating Health Care Resources in an Imperfect World" (1995) 58
Mod. L. Rev. 867; P. Wilson, "Casenote, Court of Appeal: R v. Cambridge Health Authority,
exparte B" (1995) 17 J. Soc. Welfare & Fam. L. 359.
83. R. v. Gloucester CC, exp. Mayood; R. v. Islington, exp. McMillan, The Times (21 June
1995); R. v. Gloucester CC, exp. Barry; R. v. Lancashire CC exp. RADAR, [1996] 4 All E.R.
421 (C.A.) [hereinafter Barry]. For a discussion see B. Schwehr, "Rational Rationing of
Community Care Resources" [1995] Pub. L. 374.
84. 1986, c. 33.
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(CSDPA).85 The applicants contended that this placed disabled persons
in a different category from other clients, and that the Council was
required to provide services in line with assessed needs.
The Divisional Court held that the Council could take its resources into
account in assessing needs and deciding what services to provide, but the
applicants won a declaration that the council had acted unlawfully on the
narrow procedural point that it had ceased providing services without
reassessing their personal circumstances. The Court of Appeal went
further and found that, under s. 2 of the CSDPA, the local authority was
not entitled to take account of resources in deciding whether to provide
services to meet the needs of a disabled person. Swinton Thomas L.J. said
that it would otherwise be possible for an authority to make a "judgment
that a disabled person has a need which it is necessary to meet applying
objective criteria but they are not required to meet it because of shortage
of funds,resulting in an unmet need."6 This would "fly in the face" of the
plain language of the 1970 Act.
In the House of Lords this judgment was overturned by a majority of
three to two. Lord Nicholls held that needs could not be sensibly assessed
without reference to the cost of providing services. He said that the
judgment of needs must necessarily proceed against some standards or
criteria, which in practice could be set only by the relevant local authority.
This would involve balancing the relative costs and benefits, so that "in
deciding how much weight is to be attached to cost some evaluation or
assumption has to be made about the impact the cost will have on the
authority. '87 This might have the consequence that eligibility criteria
would become more or less stringent depending on the authority's
financial position.
The Lords clarified how the duty to assess needs under the CSDPA
related to duties arising from other legislation. Lord Clyde noted that s.
2(1) of the CSDPA must be read with s. 29 of the National Assistance Act
1948, and s. 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970. He said
that these statutes required local authorities to exercise their social
services functions in accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of
State. On this basis s. 2 of the CSDPA was "not marked out as anything
special or unique in the general regime of social welfare.""8 Since a local
authority might take costs into account under s. 29 of the 1948 Act, it
85. 1970,c.44.
86. Barry, supra note 83 at 439, per Swinton Thomas LJ.
87. R. v. Gloucestershire CC and Another, exp. Barry, [1997] 2 W.L.R. 459 (H.L.),per Lord
Nicholls at 470.
88. Ibid. at 473, per Lord Clyde.
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might be expected that costs would remain a proper consideration under
the CSDPA, even though s. 2 is "silent" on this matter. Lord Clyde (like
McCowan J. in the High Court) drew a distinction between the duty to
provide services under s. 2, and the earlier stage of assessment when the
local authority satisfies itself as to what resources are necessary to meet
the need:
The duty only arises if and when the local authority is so satisfied. But
when it does arise it is clear that a shortage of resources will not excuse a
failure in the performance of the duty. However neither the fact that the
section imposes a duty towards the individual ...nor the fact that
consideration of resources is not relevant to the question of whether the
duty is to be performed or not, means that a consideration of resources may
not be relevant to the earlier stages of the implementation of the section
which lead up to the stage when satisfaction is achieved. The earlier stages
envisaged by the section require it to be distinguished from the emergence
of the duty.89
The effect of the judgment was to set s. 2 of the CSDPA firmly within the
general community care regime created by the 1990 Act. The view that
s. 47(1) of the NHSCCA allowed resources to be considered in making
assessments of need and providing services, while s. 47(2) of that Act and
s. 2 of the 1970 Act did not, was rejected. Lord Clyde held that "section
2(1) is clearly embodied in the whole of the community care regime,
distinct only in its particular procedure and the importing of an express
duty of performance once the local authority has been satisfied regarding
the necessity to make the arrangements."' The judgment established that
local authorities could take resources into account in making assessment
decisions, whether or not a disabled person was involved, subject to the
usual requirement that they act with Wednesbury reasonableness.
Although the legal principles at issue in B and Barry were not crucially
affected by the provisions of the 1990 Act, both cases arose from
circumstances closely bound up with the NHS and community care
reforms. Indeed, the cases may be formulated in the language of health
policy rather than law, as a dispute over whether treatments can be
legitimately funded from a finite extra-contractual referral budget, and
whether services can be properly withdrawn from clients assessed as
needing them as a result of cuts in the central government grant to local
authorities. Considered from this perspective, the cases have an obvious
contemporary dimension. Counsel in both cases made extensive refer-
ence to Departmental guidance on the provision of services after the 1990
89. Ibid. at 474.
90. Ibid. at 476.
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Act. Arguably, the health and social care reforms (which made rationing
dilemmas more transparent) provided an important context for the
decisions, and may well have influenced those judges who departed from
the orthodox approach. The Barry case, though turning on the straightfor-
ward point of the construction of the statute as containing an absolute duty
to provide services assessed as necessary, was notable for the minority's
willingness to support such an interpretation, even though it marked a
departure from the judiciary's traditional tendency towards restraint in
cases with a strong political dimension. Ex parte B illustrates that
reasonableness is a relative concept, reflecting changing values in soci-
ety, and that in the 1990s the orthodox Wednesbury position has become
more difficult to sustain. Although unsuccessful, an attempt was made to
articulate principles to deal with the consequences of unreasonable health
care allocation decisions comparable to those applied in other areas of
administrative decision making. Arguments based upon these principles
are likely to re-surface in future cases.
The critical weakness of the British system of judicial review in the
health resources arena is that even where the applicants' arguments are
accepted by the court, it is unlikely that a remedy will be forthcoming.
Thus, in another well-known case from the 1990s where a bone marrow
treatment unit was closed without consultation, leaving a child on the
waiting list untreated, the court accepted that the closure was invalid but
refused to grant a declaration or order.9' We have suggested that the
climate may be changing, and some judges may be prepared to erect
boundaries beyond which health authorities pleading lack of resources
cannot go. However, it must be emphasized that, even where a decision
is found to be unlawful, it it likely that the court would require the
authority merely to reconsider the case, rather than forcing a re-allocation
of resources.
More directive measures would take the courts into difficult waters of
political accountability and expert medical opinion that they have always
sought to avoid. One well-established argument against a more active
role for the courts is that litigation may favour the patient groups with the
strongest voices. McK. Norrie has commented on the problems that might
arise if "decisions were made to favour patients on the basis of which
patient is likely to go to court, or who is likely to make a fuss in public if
91. R. v. NW Thames RHA, exp. Daniels, [1993] 4 Med. L.R. 364.
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there is an adverse decision."9 2 Although the Barry case did give one
Cinderella group its day in court, the major health resource allocation
cases from the 1980s onwards have tended to involve patients with acute,
often life-threatening, conditions. Vulnerable groups face formidable
obstacles in arguing their case. Moreover, cultural values shape the media
reporting and political impact of cutbacks in different services. In this
regard the law reflects society and perhaps society is as yet unable to
recognize the needs of vulnerable segments of the community.
Conclusion
In summary, British Health Authorities have found it difficult to develop
commissioning on the basis of clinical effectiveness and the health needs
of their local populations, in the way envisaged in early policy docu-
ments, and have done little to achieve a more equitable distribution of
resources. Nor have the courts shown themselves willing to provide
redress to patients who suffer because services are curtailed or with-
drawn, although it is possible that judges' attitudes to such cases may be
changing. Given these limitations, the British experience is not an
especially attractive model for others to follow. The implications for
vulnerable populations must be weighed against any economic advan-
tages that internal market reforms might bring.
Before turning to any more specific lessons for Canada it is important
to recall the uncertainties that apply to all attempts to learn from other
countries' experiences. There has been a growing realization that the
importation of health service reforms from other states is more problem-
atic than many supposed. 3 Before emulating the British example,
questions should be asked about whether the NHS experience can be
replicated (even partially) in other countries, how far elements of that
system can be transplanted elsewhere, whether the alleged benefits of the
NHS system are based on research evidence, and whether positive
features of the indigenous system will be sacrificed.
One of the recurrent themes of the recent ESRC Contracts and
Competition Research Programme is that the NHS reforms were shaped
to a greater extent than is commonly acknowledged by the system that
pre-dated them. 94 The nature of contracting, in particular, is influenced
92. K. McK. Norrie, "Resource Allocation in Health Care: The Role of the Courts" in
U.J.Jensen & G. Mooney, eds., Changing Values in Medical and Health Care Decision
Making (Chichester: Wiley, 1990) at 176.
93. C.D. Collins, A.T. Green & DJ. Hunter, "International Transfers of Health Care
Reforms: Problems and Issues" (1994) 344 Lancet 248.
94. Flynn & Williams, supra note 6.
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by relational networks and organizational cultures that are highly resis-
tant to change. Contracting operates in parallel with established processes
of planning and strategic management, and is not necessarily the domi-
nant influence on the production of health care. Arguably, the achieve-
ments of the 1990s, including the significantly increased volumes of
treated patients and the remarkable ability of the workforce to implement
fundamental organizational change within planned timescales, had less
to do with new incentive structures (the market could not bootstrap itself
into existence) than with long-established service networks and systems
of administrative regulation-things that, paradoxically, the reforms
were intended to sweep away.
At a time when international health reform is adopting a common
language and a standardized repertoire of market-driven change, we need
to recognize that when the orthodox reform package is overlaid on
systems which have different cultural and organizational frameworks, it
may produce strikingly different results. The organization of Canadian
health care is decentralized and complex, less a federal system than a
collection of provincial systems with different histories and priorities. No
single reform template would be appropriate, and even selective attempts
to import market "elements" would play out in different and somewhat
unpredictable ways in different provinces when they encountered a
variety of local requirements.
Against this backdrop any apparent lessons from Britain for the
Canadian system should be advanced with caution. The benefits of the
internal market have been contested on a number of grounds, not least in
relation to rising transactions costs, duplication of facilities by competing
trusts and equity of access. On the central topic of this paper-the balance
between the acute sector and primary and community health services-
the reforms appear to have made little difference, although it is possible
to discern a subtle tilting of the balance towards the acute sector. Given
the problems that have arisen in changing the status quo under the
different systems of the 1980s and 1990s, it is questionable whether NHS
reforms at the structural or organizational levels make a real difference
to resource allocation behaviour. Arguably, existing resource allocation
patterns are shaped by a range of social and cultural influences, including
professional power, medical and nursing socialization, institutional his-
tories, media reportage and public attitudes. These forces operate at a
more fundamental level and change relatively slowly.
The British experience shows that the period of reform associated with
the efforts to create an internal market has not been a propitious time to
attempt to reallocate resources more equitably between sectors, and may
actually have had unanticipated negative effects. The launching of the
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new system involved the largest accountancy exercise ever undertaken in
the NHS and put considerable strain on the system. Such activities as
health needs assessment and purchasing for "health gain" were inevitably
given a lower priority than the basic work of financial management and
development of contracting systems. Beyond this, the reforms accentu-
ated cost pressures from acute hospitals by casting them in a "flagship"
role, and selecting waiting times as a test of success. When the viability
of these hospitals was threatened by rising admissions, partly through
increasing numbers of emergency cases, extra resources were consumed.
Similar activity trends have been reported in some Swedish county
council areas which have implemented internal market arrangements,
and where (as in Britain) hospital revenue is dependent on patient
throughput.95 Arguably, more attention needs to be given to changing the
structure of incentives for referring doctors and hospitals.
Countries determined to push ahead with market-oriented reforms
might also be well advised to ensure that arrangements to safeguard
primary and community health care are in place from the beginning.
Market systems are not inherently supportive of decentralized primary
care based services, which may find it more difficult than secondary
services to develop contract currencies and information systems.96 Al-
though British policy makers recognized the importance of primary and
community care (not least by the support given to fundholding), there
were problems of organizational coordination and it became necessary to
take remedial action to give new direction to the reforms. The Health
Authorities Act 199597 is seen by many commentators as a necessary
corrective step, which reflected the rushed timescale of the 1990 legisla-
tion and the belated recognition of the need to bring primary and
secondary care into a single management framework.
A final point is that it sometimes helps to see the endpoint before
embarking on a course of action, and in the case of Britain's "health care
experiment" the endpoint is not yet clear. By the time the studies reported
above were completed, the HA commissioning model was being cast into
doubt by moves to augment the purchasing role of general practitioners.
The British Labour Party's victory in the May 1997 election has intro-
95. A. Bruce & E. Jonsson, Competition in the Provision of Health Care: The Experience of
the U.S., Sweden and Britain (Aldershot: Arena, 1996).
96. Collins, Green & Hunter, supra note 90, discuss the damaging effects market reforms
have had in some developing countries where primary health care strategies had led to advances
in areas like community participation, decentralization and multi-sectoral approaches to
health.
97. 1995,c. 17.
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duced further uncertainty about the future shape of the NHS. Although
the Labour Party had pledged to abolish the internal market,no bill for this
purpose was included in the new Government's first Queen's speech. At
the time of writing, some limited steps have been taken to curtail the GP
fundholder scheme and reduce the administrative costs of contracting.98
Many commentators consider that the purchaser-provider split will
remain, but that annual contracts will be replaced by multi-year service
agreements within a planning rather than a competition framework.
There are some indications that the emphasis on a primary care-led NHS
will continue, although the fundholding scheme is likely to give way to
some version of locality purchasing led by general practitioners. It may
be that policy makers presently enamoured with the British model will
want to await future developments before replicating aspects of a system
that now seems set to be dismantled. If health care reforms are introduced
precipitately, there is a real danger that vulnerable populations will suffer.
98. For recent guidance see: U.K. NHS, Changing the Internal Market, NHS Executive
Circular (Executive Letter) EL(97)33, (London: DOH, 1997).
